My research focuses on the politics of crime and justice in armed conflict. I am particularly interested in how these dynamics cross borders — through rebel leader exile, extradition, universal jurisdiction, and external sponsorship.
Research Areas:
International security and civil war
International Law and Accountability
Transnational dimensions of armed conflict
Publications
“Peace Under the Influence? The Role of Illicit Drug Economies in Peace Processes and Rebel Splintering" With Do Young Gong. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2026. (Online First) [Article] [Manuscript] [Replication]
How do the economic foundations of rebel groups shape civil war dynamics? While prior research has explored how different resource types affect conflict, less is known about how the illicit nature of certain resources—particularly drug economies—affects peace processes. We argue that the inherent illegality of drug-based financing imposes structural barriers to peace, distinguishing it from other forms of rebel revenue. Using cross-national dyadic data from 1990 to 2011, we find that drug-reliant rebel groups are 33% less likely to initiate peace talks and over six times more likely to fragment once negotiations begin. These findings suggest that drug-based financing generates a self- reinforcing cycle that sustains violence. In contrast to accounts emphasizing grievances produced by peace processes, we show that some groups may be structurally predis- posed to reject peace altogether. Our findings call for theoretical and policy approaches tailored to the distinct challenges posed by illicit rebel drug economies.
“Crumbling Safe Havens? International Justice Regime and Conflict Amnesty for Serious Crimes.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2026. (Online First) [Article] [Manuscript] [Replication]
Why does amnesty for mass atrocities persist despite the international justice regime’s efforts to end impunity? I address this puzzle by highlighting a new dynamic in contemporary civil wars: the growing risk of international prosecution in rebel groups’ foreign sanctuaries. I argue that the international justice regime—particularly the International Criminal Court (ICC) and universal jurisdiction—undermines the security of these sanctuaries, making return under amnesty more attractive for rebel groups. This logic explains why amnesty for serious crimes persists, if not increases, despite the global norm against impunity. Large-N analyses show, first, that rebel groups operating abroad and facing international legal risk are more likely to obtain amnesty, and second, that amnesty provisions increase as prosecution risks rise in host states. The findings reveal an irony of global justice: a system created to end impunity entrenches it through amnesties, while simultaneously constraining warlords’ operational space and narrowing their strategic options.
Under Review
“Leader Accountability in Civil War” (With Alyssa Prorok) [PDF]
Political leaders occupy a central place in theories of wartime behavior . A core assumption in existing work is that leaders seek to avoid punishment by their domestic audiences , and th is incentive shape s conflict behavior. Using novel data on leaders’ war - related losses of power, we empirically assess this logic’s applicability to civil conflict by examining three foundational assumptions : that leaders’ risk of punishment increases as 1) costs of war mount, 2) they increasingly target civilians , and 3) they engage in negotiations with rebels . W e find mixed support for these accountability logics: democratic leaders are held accountable for mounting civil war costs, but we find little evidence that leaders are punished for targeting civilians or negotiating. Furthermore, a dditional analyses show that vulnerable leaders are more, not less, likely to engage in these behaviors. We conclude that s cholars must account for the se nuances when building upon leader accountability - based arguments to explain conflict behavior.
This paper examines an overlooked yet important outcome of the international justice regime on civil war: rebel leaders going into exile. Utilizing an original dataset detailing the exile trajectories of rebel leaders (1989-2017), including when and where they flee, the study reveals two key findings. First, as a rebel's home government becomes more susceptible to the international legal regime, rebel leaders implicated in serious human rights violations are more likely to seek exile. Second, the international justice regime shrinks the options for exile for these culpable rebel leaders: unlike in previous eras, now, when pursuing asylum, rebel leaders strategically select destinations with a lower likelihood of legal repercussions—leaving fewer options for their safe haven. These findings have critical implications for the literature on civil war, international law, and how law enforcement affects the migration patterns of implicated political leaders.
Working Papers
(†: student/RA co-author)
“Bite the Hand that Feeds: Sponsor--Rebel Relations after Regime Transition” (With Xiaoyan Qiu)
State-sponsored rebel groups are a defining feature of modern international politics, often catalyzing diplomatic tensions and, at times, triggering interstate conflicts. The prevailing wisdom suggests that states sponsor rebels in rival nations to wage proxy wars or install regimes more amenable to their interests, frequently selecting groups with shared ethnolinguistic or religious identities to ensure preference alignment. This strategic alignment is theorized to foster warmer relations between a rebel group-turned-government and its former patrons than the sponsors’ relationship with the previous regime. Yet, empirical evidence substantiating this outcome remains elusive. This study examines how the transition of an externally sponsored rebel group from insurgency to governance influences its relationship with former sponsors. Our study delves into the post-conflict dynamics of state-sponsored insurgencies by evaluating dyadic diplomatic relations from 1946 to 2012 using data on instances of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID), similarities in UN General Assembly voting patterns, and high-level diplomatic engagement. Our preliminary findings suggest that while sponsored regimes initially align with their benefactors, this alignment does not significantly surpass that of non-sponsored regime transitions. This raises questions about the long-term strategic value of rebel sponsorship and challenges the prevailing narrative of its efficacy in shaping international alliances.
“The Double Bind of International Justice: Shorter Wars or Fewer Atrocities?"
How do overlapping international and domestic legal threats reshape the trajectory of civil wars? While scholars have long debated the "peace versus justice" trade-off, we lack an understanding of how rebels navigate simultaneous pressure from home governments and foreign jurisdictions. This paper introduces a theory of dual enforcement, arguing that the interaction between domestic and international accountability creates divergent strategic pathways for rebel groups. When rebels face robust international threats (e.g., International Criminal Justice or universal jurisdiction) but weak domestic enforcement, they are incentivized to settle; however, they intensify civilian victimization to maximize bargaining leverage before disarming. Conversely, when both domestic and foreign authorities impose high prosecutorial risks, rebels face a "double bind." Unable to secure impunity through flight or negotiation, they prolong the conflict while exercising restraint toward civilians to evade further scrutiny. Testing these claims on a global dataset of civil wars (1946–2023), findings highlight a tragic dilemma for international justice: the configuration of domestic and international pressures can facilitate shorter wars or minimize atrocities, but it rarely achieves both.
“Measuring Legal Commitment to Universal Jurisdiction: The LCUJ Index, 1945–2023” (With Michael Gavin Gergeni†)
Which states are legally positioned to exercise universal jurisdiction, and why do some build robust legal infrastructures while others do not? Existing research tracks where universal jurisdiction has been practiced, but practice-centered data cannot measure legal capacity independently of prosecutorial opportunity. This paper introduces the Legal Commitment to Universal Jurisdiction (LCUJ) Index, the first systematic, longitudinal measure of states' formal capacity to prosecute war crimes under universal jurisdiction, covering 198 states from 1945 to 2023. We document two structurally distinct waves of legal diffusion and provide evidence on their drivers. Rome Statute ratification increased domestic UJ legal capacity through a complementarity-driven mechanism, with treaty commitment responding immediately and domestic legislative implementation following with a lag. Regional peer adoption, statistically inconsequential before the Rome Statute, became a powerful driver of legal upgrading afterward, indicating a structural shift from idiosyncratic adoption to regional cascade. The index also identifies states with strong legal infrastructure but no prosecutorial record as latent forum states whose capacity may prove increasingly important as the ICC faces mounting political constraints.
“Bringing the Rebel Home: The Conditions of Return and Peace"
Rebel leaders often continue to shape conflict from exile, yet we know little about when they return home or whether their return promotes peace. I argue that return becomes more likely when political insecurity converges across the home and host countries, while what follows depends on the terms governing reentry. High coup risk can weaken an incumbent’s ability to resist return or increase the value of accommodating a former challenger, but this opening matters most when a leadership transition in the host country also makes continued exile less secure. I test this argument using an original dataset of 198 rebel leaders and 211 exile episodes observed between 1947 and 2025. Episode-year analyses show that home-country coup risk has little relationship with voluntary return in the absence of a host-country leadership transition but becomes strongly associated with return following such a transition. Event-centered analyses further show that returns embedded in formal negotiated agreements are followed by substantially larger reductions in battle-related deaths than informally coordinated or uncoordinated returns. These reductions extend to violence against civilians by both rebels and governments. Return is therefore a distinct stage of transnational rebellion: insecurity at home and abroad structures when leaders leave exile, while the institutional terms of reentry shape whether return becomes a path toward peace.
Work-in-progress
"When Civil Wars Cross Borders:Hosting Warlords and Interstate Friction" (With Do Won Kwak)
“Crafting Global Justice: The Dynamics of International Law-Making on Universal Jurisdiction.” (With Soojin Lee†)
"Rebel Leader Exile and Civil War Spillover"
“Leader Accountability in Rebel Organizations.” (With Alyssa Prorok)
"Tracking the Global Web of Extradition Treaties"
Mentor of Awardee for 2025 Outstanding Poster Presentation, University of Illinois Campus-Wide Undergraduate Research Symposium (URAP)