My research focuses on the politics of crime and justice in civil conflict. I am particularly interested in how these dynamics cross borders — through rebel leader exile, extradition, universal jurisdiction, and external sponsorship.
My research focuses on the politics of crime and justice in civil conflict. I am particularly interested in how these dynamics cross borders — through rebel leader exile, extradition, universal jurisdiction, and external sponsorship.
Publications
“Peace Under the Influence? The Role of Illicit Drug Economies in Peace Processes and Rebel Splintering" With Do Young Gong. Journal of Conflict Resolution. (Forthcoming.) [PDF]
How do the economic foundations of rebel groups shape civil war dynamics? While prior research has explored how different resource types affect conflict, less is known about how the illicit nature of certain resources—particularly drug economies—affects peace processes. We argue that the inherent illegality of drug-based financing imposes structural barriers to peace, distinguishing it from other forms of rebel revenue. Using cross-national dyadic data from 1990 to 2011, we find that drug-reliant rebel groups are 33% less likely to initiate peace talks and over six times more likely to fragment once negotiations begin. These findings suggest that drug-based financing generates a self- reinforcing cycle that sustains violence. In contrast to accounts emphasizing grievances produced by peace processes, we show that some groups may be structurally predis- posed to reject peace altogether. Our findings call for theoretical and policy approaches tailored to the distinct challenges posed by illicit rebel drug economies.
“Crumbling Safe Havens? International Justice Regime and Conflict Amnesty for Serious Crimes.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2026. (Online First) [Article] [Manuscript] [Replication]
Why does amnesty for mass atrocities persist despite the international justice regime’s efforts to end impunity? I address this puzzle by highlighting a new dynamic in contemporary civil wars: the growing risk of international prosecution in rebel groups’ foreign sanctuaries. I argue that the international justice regime—particularly the International Criminal Court (ICC) and universal jurisdiction—undermines the security of these sanctuaries, making return under amnesty more attractive for rebel groups. This logic explains why amnesty for serious crimes persists, if not increases, despite the global norm against impunity. Large-N analyses show, first, that rebel groups operating abroad and facing international legal risk are more likely to obtain amnesty, and second, that amnesty provisions increase as prosecution risks rise in host states. The findings reveal an irony of global justice: a system created to end impunity entrenches it through amnesties, while simultaneously constraining warlords’ operational space and narrowing their strategic options.
Under Review
“Leader Accountability in Civil War” (With Alyssa Prorok) [PDF]
Political leaders occupy a central place in theories of wartime behavior . A core assumption in existing work is that leaders seek to avoid punishment by their domestic audiences , and th is incentive shape s conflict behavior. Using novel data on leaders’ war - related losses of power, we empirically assess this logic’s applicability to civil conflict by examining three foundational assumptions : that leaders’ risk of punishment increases as 1) costs of war mount, 2) they increasingly target civilians , and 3) they engage in negotiations with rebels . W e find mixed support for these accountability logics: democratic leaders are held accountable for mounting civil war costs, but we find little evidence that leaders are punished for targeting civilians or negotiating. Furthermore, a dditional analyses show that vulnerable leaders are more, not less, likely to engage in these behaviors. We conclude that s cholars must account for the se nuances when building upon leader accountability - based arguments to explain conflict behavior.
This paper examines an overlooked yet important outcome of the international justice regime on civil war: rebel leaders going into exile. Utilizing an original dataset detailing the exile trajectories of rebel leaders (1989-2017), including when and where they flee, the study reveals two key findings. First, as a rebel's home government becomes more susceptible to the international legal regime, rebel leaders implicated in serious human rights violations are more likely to seek exile. Second, the international justice regime shrinks the options for exile for these culpable rebel leaders: unlike in previous eras, now, when pursuing asylum, rebel leaders strategically select destinations with a lower likelihood of legal repercussions—leaving fewer options for their safe haven. These findings have critical implications for the literature on civil war, international law, and how law enforcement affects the migration patterns of implicated political leaders.
Working Papers
Kim, Myung Jung, and Xiaoyan Qiu. “Bite the Hand that Feeds: Sponsor-Rebel Relations after Regime Transition.”
Kim, Myung Jung. "The Double Bind of International Justice: Shorter Wars or Fewer Casualties?"
Kim, Myung Jung, and Michael Gergeni. “Measuring Legal Commitment to Universal Jurisdiction: The LCUJ Index, 1945–2023.”
Kim, Myung Jung. "Bringing Rebellion Home: Exiled Rebel Leaders and the Re-domestication of Transnational Insurgency"
Work-in-progress
"Rebel Leader Exile and Civil War Spillover"
"Hosting Rebels, Importing Rivalry: Rebel-Leader Exile and Interstate Tensions" (With Do Won Kwak)
“Leader Accountability in Rebel Organizations.” (With Alyssa Prorok)
“Crafting Global Justice: The Dynamics of International Law-Making on Universal Jurisdiction.”
"Tracking the Global Web of Extradition Treaties"