The enforcement of international law (IL) has fundamentally altered the landscape of civil wars by challenging the impunity once enjoyed by perpetrators of atrocities. Mechanisms like the International Criminal Court (ICC) and Universal Jurisdiction (UJ) have dismantled safe havens, exposing rebel groups to prosecution risks abroad, while domestic legal frameworks shape risks at home. This book examines how these dual pressures influence rebel strategies, conflict duration, and civilian outcomes. 

The book argues that the interaction of prosecution risks at home and abroad creates divergent outcomes. When domestic risks are low but international risks are high, rebels are incentivized to return home under amnesty agreements, facilitating peace but increasing short-term civilian targeting as they seek bargaining leverage. When risks are high both domestically and internationally, conflicts are prolonged due to stalled negotiations, yet civilian targeting decreases as rebels seek to evade ICC scrutiny. These dynamics reveal a policy dilemma: robust IL enforcement may deter atrocities but complicate peace processes, while leniency may secure peace at the expense of justice.

This study leverages two original datasets—one on rebel leader exile patterns and another on universal jurisdiction laws—alongside detailed case analyses of conflicts in Sierra Leone, Uganda, Chad, and South Sudan. Rich qualitative insights derived from interviews with rebel actors and peace practitioners provide robust empirical support for the theoretical framework.

This study bridges international relations, law, and conflict studies, offering a novel framework to understand the unintended consequences of global justice. It contributes to academic debates on accountability, peacebuilding, and rebel behavior, while providing actionable insights for policymakers navigating the justice-peace trade-off. Case studies of Sierra Leone, Uganda, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan ground the analysis in real-world contexts, making the book relevant to both scholars and practitioners.

PAPER 1

Crumbling Safe Havens?
International Justice Regime and Conflict Amnesty for Serious Crimes

Invited to revise and resubmit (R&R) at the Journal of Conflict Resolution | PDF

In this paper, I theorize the impact of international law on rebels operating in foreign territories. I argue that the international justice regime, primarily through the ICC and Universal Jurisdiction, introduces new prosecutorial risks that undermine the security provided by foreign territories previously regarded as safe havens. This shift incentivizes rebels operating abroad to return home under the protection of amnesty. Employing a large-N analysis and case illustrations of the peace processes in Chad and the Central African Republic, I find that as the risk of international prosecutions increases in host countries, rebel groups are more likely to secure amnesty to facilitate their return, thereby advancing conflict resolution. This highlights important unintended impacts of international law: shrinking the operational range for war criminals and making internationalized civil wars more contained within national borders.

PAPER 2

The Narrowing Path

: Rebel Leader Exile in the Age of Accountability 

Under Review | PDF

This paper examines how a state’s adherence to international legal norms for punishing international crimes influences the exile patterns of rebel leaders. I advance two main arguments: First, as a rebel’s home government is more committed to the prosecution of international crimes, evidenced by domestic legal incorporation of international law and the ratification of relevant international treaties, rebel leaders implicated in serious human rights violations are more likely to opt for exile as the prospect of amnesty is diminished. Second, the international justice regime restricts options for potential exile destinations, leading rebel leaders to choose destinations with minimal legal risks, especially those lacking universal jurisdiction mechanisms and ICC involvement. Utilizing two original datasets—one tracking rebel leader exile events (1989-2017) and another documenting states’ commitments to prosecuting international crimes—the study provides empirical support for these arguments. The findings highlight how international law inadvertently affects civil war dynamics by fostering more frequent exile of rebel leaders, which often triggers interstate conflicts and cross-border violence. Additionally, it reveals that a state’s rigorous incorporation of international anti-impunity norms effectively deters war criminals from operating within its national borders.

PAPER 3

Internal and External Threats

: International Law, Rebel Behaviors, and War Outcomes 

This paper extends the first two papers to advance our understanding of how combined domestic and external threats of punishment for international crimes affect rebel behaviors and civil war outcomes. I argue that an increased risk of prosecution in foreign jurisdictions motivates rebels to seek a peaceful settlement, especially when their home state is less constrained by the international justice regime and more likely to offer amnesty. If both the rebel’s home and host countries pose a high risk of punishment, however, it makes compromised outcomes less likely: Rebels may either escalate violence, causing greater civilian casualties in a ”gamble for resurrection,” or curtail activities by hiding or surrendering to the ICC, leading to significant victories or total defeats. I test this argument using a large-N analysis and a cross-case analysis of conflicts in South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Uganda, and Sierra Leone. Each case study examines a distinct combination of domestic and international prosecutorial threats faced by rebel actors and their varied war outcomes.