My three-paper dissertation, “Negotiating Justice, Rebel Behaviors, and War Outcomes in the Era of Accountability,” examines the impact of the rapid expansion of international criminal prosecutions targeting rebels on the dynamics of civil conflict. Prevailing scholarship has predominantly focused on how the international justice regime undermines amnesty, thereby affecting peace negotiations between rebel groups and governments. Nevertheless, this focus has led to a significant oversight: the tendency of rebel groups to seek refuge in foreign territories to evade punishment. My dissertation addresses this gap by examining both the internal and external threats of punishment faced by rebel actors under the shadow of international prosecutions and their combined effect on rebel behaviors and civil war outcomes. It specifically investigates how and under what conditions the International Criminal Court (ICC) and Universal Jurisdiction (UJ) represent threats to rebel groups. To this end, the research tests three expectations concerning the effects of the international justice regime on: (1) the locations where rebels operate and establish safe havens, (2) the patterns of amnesty provisions for war crimes, and (3) the duration and outcomes of conflicts, including the incidence of civilian targeting. The analysis integrates a large-N study with two original datasets (1946-2023) with cross-case studies that include interviews with rebel leaders and peace experts.

PAPER 1

Crumbling Safe Havens?
International Justice Regime and Conflict Amnesty for Serious Crimes

Invited to revise and resubmit (R&R) at the Journal of Conflict Resolution | PDF

In this paper, I theorize the impact of international law on rebels operating in foreign territories. I argue that the international justice regime, primarily through the ICC and Universal Jurisdiction, introduces new prosecutorial risks that undermine the security provided by foreign territories previously regarded as safe havens. This shift incentivizes rebels operating abroad to return home under the protection of amnesty. Employing a large-N analysis and case illustrations of the peace processes in Chad and the Central African Republic, I find that as the risk of international prosecutions increases in host countries, rebel groups are more likely to secure amnesty to facilitate their return, thereby advancing conflict resolution. This highlights important unintended impacts of international law: shrinking the operational range for war criminals and making internationalized civil wars more contained within national borders.

PAPER 2

The Narrowing Path

: Rebel Leader Exile in the Age of Accountability 

Under Review | PDF

This paper examines how a state’s adherence to international legal norms for punishing international crimes influences the exile patterns of rebel leaders. I advance two main arguments: First, as a rebel’s home government is more committed to the prosecution of international crimes, evidenced by domestic legal incorporation of international law and the ratification of relevant international treaties, rebel leaders implicated in serious human rights violations are more likely to opt for exile as the prospect of amnesty is diminished. Second, the international justice regime restricts options for potential exile destinations, leading rebel leaders to choose destinations with minimal legal risks, especially those lacking universal jurisdiction mechanisms and ICC involvement. Utilizing two original datasets—one tracking rebel leader exile events (1989-2017) and another documenting states’ commitments to prosecuting international crimes—the study provides empirical support for these arguments. The findings highlight how international law inadvertently affects civil war dynamics by fostering more frequent exile of rebel leaders, which often triggers interstate conflicts and cross-border violence. Additionally, it reveals that a state’s rigorous incorporation of international anti-impunity norms effectively deters war criminals from operating within its national borders.

PAPER 3

Internal and External Threats

: International Law, Rebel Behaviors, and War Outcomes 

In Progress

This paper extends the first two papers to advance our understanding of how combined domestic and external threats of punishment for international crimes affect rebel behaviors and civil war outcomes. I argue that an increased risk of prosecution in foreign jurisdictions motivates rebels to seek a peaceful settlement, especially when their home state is less constrained by the international justice regime and more likely to offer amnesty. If both the rebel’s home and host countries pose a high risk of punishment, however, it makes compromised outcomes less likely: Rebels may either escalate violence, causing greater civilian casualties in a ”gamble for resurrection,” or curtail activities by hiding or surrendering to the ICC, leading to significant victories or total defeats. I test this argument using a large-N analysis and a cross-case analysis of conflicts in South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Uganda, and Sierra Leone. Each case study examines a distinct combination of domestic and international prosecutorial threats faced by rebel actors and their varied war outcomes. For these case studies, I have so far conducted eight in-depth interviews with former and current rebel leaders, foot soldiers, and a peace agreement signatory from civil society.  I plan to develop this dissertation into a book manuscript after expanding these case studies with additional interviews.